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BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
LYNN A. BAKER*
What conditions may the government constitutionally impose on the re-
ceipt of "public assistance"?' The Supreme Court first considered this ques-
tion in 1963 in Sherbert v. Verner,2 and by 1989 had decided twenty-three
such "unconstitutional conditions" cases.3 No pattern was readily visible in the
results of these cases,4 however, and commentators' attempts to make sense of
them yielded only expressions of despair and normative proposals.'
In 1990, I offered a positive theory of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in those twenty-three Supreme Court decisions.6 The theory proposed
that the Court invalidated only those challenged conditions that required per-
sons unable to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for the perti-
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. B.A., Yale University, 1978;
B.A., Oxford University, 1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985.
This essay was prepared for the symposium on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
held at the University of Denver College of Law on March 17-18, 1995. 1 am grateful to Dean
Dennis Lynch, the Denver law faculty, and the editors of the Denver University Law Review for
providing a stimulating and enjoyable environment for revisiting the unconstitutional conditions
paradox, and to Julie Nice for her thoughtful commentary. I presented a preliminary version of
some of the arguments contained in this essay at a conference on "Bargaining with the State,"
held at the Law and Economics Center of the George Mason University Law School in March
1994, and I am grateful to Richard Epstein for his comments on that occasion. My colleagues,
Toni Massaro and Ted Schneyer, as always, provided insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. By "public assistance" I mean all government-provided "necessities of life," whether in
the form of a cash grant or in-kind aid. Such benefits include food stamps, medical care, and cash
grants to those unable for various reasons to earn a subsistence income. I mean, therefore, to
include not only "welfare," but also non-need-based income maintenance insurance schemes such
as Unemployment Compensation and Social Security, which provide cash grants to the unem-
ployed, some of whom might have savings and other assets sufficient to provide them a subsis-
tence income even in the absence of paid employment.
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. For a complete list of these cases, see Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a
Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185, 1200 n.49 (1985).
4. See id. at 1201-02.
5. The principal recent commentaries on unconstitutional conditions which discuss these
cases at greatest length are RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); Richard
A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); and
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413 (1989).
Some of the earlier unconstitutional conditions scholarship also discussed the (then-exis-
tent) public assistance cases, but similarly failed to provide a positive theory of the Court's hold-
ings. See, e.g., Frederick Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional Prob-
lems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. LJ. 183 (1964); Hans Linde, Constitutional Rights in the
Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 (1964);
Robert M. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 443 (1966); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
6. See Baker, supra note 3.
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nent benefit, to pay a higher price to exercise their constitutional rights than
similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income.'
Since the publication of my positive theory, the Court has decided two
important unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance bene-
fits: Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,' and
Rust v. Sullivan.9 In addition, Professor Richard Epstein has published Bar-
gaining with the State, the most comprehensive normative theory and detailed
examination of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine ever presented by a
legal scholar.
In this Essay, I revisit my positive theory of the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine with two major goals. First, I seek to determine whether the
Court's decisions in Smith and Rust are consistent with my positive theory
and, therefore, also with the Court's previous decisions in unconstitutional
conditions cases involving public assistance benefits. Second, I undertake a
critical examination of Epstein's normative theory, as he has applied it to
Smith and Rust and as it might be applied to other public assistance cases, in
an attempt to ascertain whether overall social welfare would be increased if
the Court were to employ Epstein's proposed test rather than the test my posi-
tive theory suggests the Court has implicitly applied in these cases since 1963.
Part I sets out the two-prong test that I contend the Court, sub silentio,
has applied in unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance
benefits, and discusses the test's normative underpinnings. It then describes the
test that Epstein would have the Court employ in these cases and in all other
unconstitutional conditions cases regardless of the government benefit at issue.
Parts II and III examine the Court's decisions in Smith and Rust, respec-
tively, first in light of my positive theory and then as Epstein has applied his
normative theory to each. Part IV applies Epstein's theory to two public assis-
tance cases that he does not discuss, United States Department of Agriculture
v. Moreno0 and Dandridge v. Williams," and compares the result reached
and the analytic path taken under his normative theory with their counterparts
under my positive theory.
The Essay concludes by explaining why it is hard to know whether over-
all social welfare would be increased if the Court either began to employ, or
had always employed, Epstein's proposed test in unconstitutional conditions
cases involving public assistance benefits rather than the test my positive
theory suggests the Court has always implicitly applied in these cases.
I. A TALE OF TWO THEORIES
Under my positive theory, the Court, sub silentio, employs a straightfor-
ward two-prong test in deciding unconstitutional conditions cases involving
7. Id. at 1188, 1213-20.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
10. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
11. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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public assistance benefits. The first prong asks whether the challenged con-
dition impinges on a constitutionally protected activity. If not, the condition is
sustained. If so, however, the second prong then asks whether the effect of the
challenged condition is to require persons unable to earn a subsistence income
and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit to pay a higher price to engage
in that constitutionally protected activity than similarly situated persons earn-
ing a subsistence income. Only if the answer to this question is also affirma-
tive will the Court overturn the challenged condition. My examination of the
twenty-three challenges to conditions on public assistance benefits that the
Court heard between 1963 and 1989 revealed this two-prong test to be both
easily applied and a consistently good predictor of outcome, notwithstanding
the fact that the decisions spanned the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist
Courts.1
3
Implicit in this test is a baseline not previously considered by commenta-
tors: the Court compares the position of individuals unable to earn a subsis-
tence income and otherwise eligible for the pertinent benefit, with the position
of other, similarly situated individuals whose source of a subsistence income is
employment.' 4 And the Court conducts this comparison with reference to the
price the two groups are required to pay to exercise their constitutional rights.
The baselines traditionally discussed in the unconstitutional conditions context,
in contrast, would have the Court compare the position of individuals other-
wise eligible for a conditioned public assistance benefit with their own posi-
tion in either a world in which that benefit is made available without the at-
tached condition or a world in which that benefit is not made available at
all. 5
Underlying this positive theory is an appreciation that the equality in the
Constitution's allocation of rights is merely a formal one. 6 Although we in-
deed share equally in the protection from various types of government interfer-
ence which the Constitution promises, the exercise of many constitutional
rights carries a price for the individual. And ours is fundamentally a market
economy. Within our economy, we each have in equal measure the freedom to
spend our (vastly unequal) resources as we choose. But the notion of "price,"
so central to both our economy and my positive theory, simultaneously perpet-
uates an unspoken inequality of costs: the same price is always a smaller pro-
portion of the total resources of a wealthy person than of a poor one. Thus, by
ensuring that persons unable to earn a subsistence income and otherwise eli-
gible for the pertinent benefit are not required to pay a higher price to exercise
their constitutional rights than persons earning such an income, the Court
guarantees a certain non-wealth-dependent equality of constitutional rights
within the constraints of our essentially market economy."
Richard Epstein, in contrast, has claimed an inability to see any desirable,
12. Baker, supra note 3, at 1217.
13. Id. at 1187-88, 1220-46.
14. Id. at 1217.
15. See id. at 1190-93 and sources cited therein; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 6-16.
16. Baker, supra note 3, at 1188, 1246-55.
17. Id. at 1197.
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large patterns in the Court's decisions in cases involving unconstitutional
conditions," and has therefore offered a normative proposal for deciding all
of these cases regardless of the government benefit at issue. 9 He would have
the Court review challenged conditions on public assistance benefits (and
seemingly any other enactments) with the single goal of maximizing Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency.20 Unlike the Pareto test of efficiency, which requires that
any social change make at least one person better off and leave no one worse
off regardless of the relative sizes of any gains and losses, the Kaldor-Hicks
measure requires only that "the winners could in principle compensate the
losers and still remain better off by their own lights."'" And because this
compensation need not actually be paid, the Kaldor-Hicks test spares society
the "transaction costs drag" of the administrative burdens that would be in-
curred operating a just compensation requirement.22
Epstein acknowledges that the courts may have difficulty evaluating legis-
lation under the Kaldor-Hicks test: "Social legislation is ordinarily exceedingly
complicated, especially when its indirect effects have to be taken into account,
and the ability to marshall either theoretical or empirical evidence of the over-
all desirability of a social scheme is usually well beyond the competence of
any court."23 Thus, he proposes that courts use a "disproportionate impact" or
"pro rata" test as an "indirect means to determine whether the targets of legis-
lation have been compensated by the state" and whether the legislation there-
fore increases aggregate social welfare.24 Where there is no "clean market
solution" and government action is therefore necessary, the pro rata test en-
ables the courts, first, to "choose that allocation of the surplus [from collective
action] that maximizes the likelihood that the beneficial social change will be
brought about by the legislature in the first place ' 25 and, second, to "mini-
mize the administrative costs associated with the operation of the system. '26
In the context of challenges to conditions on government benefits, Epstein
would have the courts sustain only those conditions that (1) advance the wel-
18. EPsTEIN, supra note 5, at 17-24.
19. Id. at 98-103.
20. Id. at 81.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 81, 83-84.
23. Id. at 86.
24. Id. at 87, 94-98.
25. Id. at 94-95. Epstein contefids that
Faced with an all-or-nothing choice (of providing the government benefit without the
problematic condition or not providing the benefit at all], all participants [in the legisla-
tive process] will prefer to adopt the desirable outcome because they know that there is
no solution available to them which allows them to garner the benefits of the legal
change while simultaneously denying it to their adversaries. Since there is no way to
obtain private gain by defecting from the social solution, there will be widespread sup-
port of the measure. In addition there will be no factional efforts to impose conditions
whose effect is to reallocate (and thereby diminish) the surplus created by legislation.
Id. at 97.
26. Id. at 95. Because Epstein's pro-rata test does not ever take into account the subjective
gains obtained by anyone, it may allow legislation that is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient to pass mus-
ter in cases where the legislation results in some increase in market value but a larger decrease in
subjective value. Id. at 96-97. But Epstein contends that "[t]he admitted allocative distortion is less
dangerous than the administrative peril that replaces it." Id. at 92.
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fare of all affected groups,27 and (2) do so in equal proportions." Thus, the
question is not whether a potential benefit recipient (or even the entire class of
these individuals) prefers the world with the conditioned benefit to a world in
which the benefit is not available at all. Rather, "[t]he question is whether the
condition advances overall social welfare, and there is no guarantee that this
will happen just because it is consented to by the individual actor."29
Epstein would have the courts use as their baseline "not the status quo
ante,"-that is, a world in which the government does not make the benefit
available at all-"but a best achievable state of affairs in which the program is
put forward without the conditions attached."3 When a condition is chal-
lenged by a benefit claimant who is "aggrieved relative to the world as it
might have been," Epstein would have the courts first "establish some use of
monopoly power by the state, as with its control of access to public high-
ways." He would then have the court examine the challenged condition to
determine whether it yields pro rata gains and is therefore permissible, or
"reduces the total size of the social surplus [resulting from the government
action] by allowing it to be redistributed through factional intrigue," and is
therefore impermissible.32
In order better to understand how Epstein's proposed test differs from the
test that my positive theory suggests the Court implicitly has applied in uncon-
stitutional conditions cases involving public assistance benefits, it may be
useful to apply both tests to some actual cases. In the next two sections, I
examine two of the Court's most recent unconstitutional conditions decisions
involving public assistance benefits, Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith33 and Rust v. Sullivan,34 in light of my positive
theory and as Epstein has applied his normative theory to each.
II. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. SMITH
In Smith, two members of the Native American Church (hereinafter "re-
spondents") were fired by their employer, a private drug rehabilitation organi-
zation, because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a church
ceremony.35 Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of
any listed "controlled substance," including peyote, unless it has been pre-
27. Id. at 98. Unfortunately, "for the sake of simplicity" Epstein's hypotheticals all involve
only "Group A" and "Group B," and it is therefore never clear how he would determine which
groups or individuals are "affected" by a particular conditional offer of a government benefit. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. Id. In the end, it is far from clear that Epstein has resolved the problem he identifies of
"fashion[ing a test that can distinguish good conditions from bad ones," given the "complex
inquiry" aimed at "maximiz[ing] the total cooperative surplus from the government action" which
he would have the courts undertake. Id.
33. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
34. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
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scribed by a medical practitioner," and the Oregon Supreme Court read this
prohibition to make no exception for the sacramental use of the drug."7 The
respondents' subsequent applications for unemployment compensation were
denied by the State of Oregon under a statutory provision disqualifying from
unemployment benefits anyone discharged for work-related "misconduct."38
Respondents challenged the denial of unemployment benefits on the ground
that it violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.39
The Smith majority understood the case to require a decision only on the
question of whether the Free Exercise Clause "permzts the State of Oregon to
include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal
prohibition on use of that drug."' For if Oregon's prohibition on peyote use,
including religiously motivated use, "'is consistent with the Federal Constitu-
tion, there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon,' and 'the
State is free to withhold unemployment compensation from respondents for
engaging in work-related misconduct, despite its religious motivation."' 4
The Smith majority explicitly framed the issue precisely as my two-prong
test predicts. If the challenged condition does not impinge on a constitutionally
protected activity-if there is no First Amendment right to use peyote for
sacramental purposes-the condition will be sustained. In the absence of any
"contention that Oregon's drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious
beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children
in those beliefs," the majority declined to hold that "when otherwise
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the
convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regula-
tion."'42 That is, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)."' 43 Failing to find the sacramental use of peyote to
be protected by the First Amendment, the Smith majority, consistent with my
positive theory, readily sustained Oregon's denial of unemployment compensa-
tion to the respondents whose dismissal resulted from such use."
Richard Epstein, too, finds Smith an easy case-but in the other direc-
tion.45 He appears to agree that the denial of unemployment benefits to re-
spondents must be sustained-that is, that respondents have no unconstitution-
36. id.
37. Id. at 876 (citing Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146,
148 (Or. 1988)).
38. Id. at 874.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 876 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S.
660, 672 (1988)).
42. Id. at 882.
43. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
44. Id. at 890.
45. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 265-68.
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al conditions claim-if the sacramental use of peyote is not constitutionally
protected.' In contrast to the Smith majority, however, Epstein would find
Oregon's criminalization of peyote use in religious services invalid under the
Free Exercise Clause.47 Considering "[t]he troubled line between action and
expression that explains so little in ordinary First Amendment law [to be] of
still less help in this context," Epstein would have the Court "ask for some
special justification for the restriction of the state criminal law in this context,
wholly without regard to government intention or singling out."' And he be-
lieves such justification is lacking in Smith: respondents' "use of peyote in
religious observance poses no threat of harm to others" and "is sharply limited
by time, place, and circumstance and carries with it none of the risks normally
associated with general drug use."'49
Thus, Epstein's difficulty with Smith appears to lie not in the Court's
application of the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine," but rather in its inter-
pretation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. And this high-
lights a larger problem with Epstein's own applications of his normative theo-
ry. Although he claims to lack interest in declaring the New Deal unconsti-
tutional,"0 and indeed seems willing to accept welfare benefits as a fixture of
the modem state,' the focus of his reformist energies is scarcely limited to a
new theory of the conditions that the state should be permitted to attach to the
various benefits it offers.
Even when Epstein undertakes to apply his theory to an actual case, he
frequently provides no answer to the question of whether the Court, given
existing interpretations of the pertinent constitutional guarantee, should have
permitted the government to offer the relevant benefit on the condition that
recipients waive that constitutional right. For the Court and many others, this
practice likely diminishes the utility, and ultimately the persuasiveness, of
Epstein's general theory of unconstitutional conditions.
46. Id. at 268. Epstein states that "[i]f the criminal prosecution should fail, so too should the
state's effort to use conduct (now lawful, and indeed protected) to deny unemployment benefits
otherwise required by state law." Id.
47. Id. at 267-68.
48. Id. at 267.
49. Id. at 267-68.
50. Id. at xiv. Epstein devoted an earlier book to that project. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAK-
INGS).
51. Epstein devotes Chapter 17 of Bargaining with the State to a discussion of welfare bene-
fits, Chapter 16 to unemployment benefits, and a total of 76 pages to "Positive Rights in the Wel-
fare State."
Since his declared intent in Bargaining with the State is "to see that useful projects go
forward in a sensible fashion, not to strike down unwise projects that should not go forward at
all," one might assume that Epstein is even willing to consider these forms of income redistribu-
tion to be examples of government "projects that promise some positive gain." EPSTEIN, supra
note 5, at xiv. Indeed, even in Takings, in which Epstein argued that "the eminent domain clause
and parallel clauses in the Constitution render constitutionally infirm or suspect many of the her-
alded reforms and institutions of the twentieth century," TAKINGS, supra note 50, at x, he express-
ly did not contend that "the ideal level of (voluntary) welfare support should be zero," id. at 322.
He argued rather that "if the state had never undertaken welfare programs, the demand for them
would be a tiny fraction of what it is today." Id.
19951
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III. RusT v. SULLivAN
Although the regulations at issue in Rust v. Sullivan 2 have been rescind-
ed by the Clinton Administration,5" the unconstitutional conditions question
that they presented remains important, both as a jurisprudential matter and be-
cause equivalent regulations might be imposed in the future. In Rust, Title X
grant recipients and doctors who supervise Title X funds (hereinafter "peti-
tioners") challenged, on behalf of themselves and their patient-clients, regula-
tions interpreting a provision of Title X of the Public Health Service Act
which specified that "'[n]one of the funds appropriated [to voluntary family
planning projects] under this subchapter shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning."' 54
These regulations imposed three related conditions on any "project" re-
ceiving Title X funds: (1) it "'may not provide counseling concerning the use
of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as
a method of family planning'; 55 (2) it may not engage in "activities that 'en-
courage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning ...;56
and (3) it must be "'physically and financially separate' from prohibited abor-
tion activities."'" Petitioners argued that the regulations violated the First
Amendment free speech rights of Title X projects' clients and health providers
by discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, and the Fifth Amendment right of
the projects' clients to choose whether to terminate their pregnancy."
Before we can apply the test suggested by my positive theory to this case,
we must ascertain what benefit and attached condition are at issue. If one
understands the benefit offered the clients of Title X projects 9 to be free
family planning counseling other than abortion referrals or counseling concern-
ing the use of abortion as a method of family planning,' there is no attached
condition. If one instead understands the benefits offered Title X projects'
clients to be free family planning counseling, the attached condition is that
these indigent women forego receiving information concerning abortion during
their meetings with Title X counselors.
Accepting the latter formulation of the conditioned benefit at issue in
Rust, we must now inquire whether there is a First Amendment right to re-
ceive information concerning abortion as a method of family planning. Insofar
as the government could not constitutionally prohibit the dissemination of
information concerning a fundamental right such as abortion, there surely is
52. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
53. 58 Fed. Reg. 7,462 (1993) (suspending rules issued at 53 Fed. Reg. 2,922 (1988) and
codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 59.7-.10) (1994).
54. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970)).
55. Id. at 179 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)).
56. Id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1989)).
57. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)).
58. Id. at 181, 192, 201.
59. The analysis under my positive theory focuses solely on the concerns of recipients of
public assistance, not the concerns of its providers.
60. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 179 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)) (emphasis added).
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such a First Amendment right.6 And the challenged condition therefore argu-
ably impinges on a constitutionally protected activity.
Under the second prong of the test suggested by my positive theory, we
must now ask whether the effect of the challenged condition is to require per-
sons unable to earn a subsistence income and otherwise eligible for the perti-
nent benefit to pay a higher price to receive family planning information con-
cerning abortion than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income.
And it seems clear that the condition does not have this effect. As the Rust
majority observed, "a woman's right to receive ... information concerning
abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X project
remains unfettered."62 The condition simply leaves clients of Title X projects
to pay the same, unsubsidized price for abortion information that those not eli-
gible for Title X-funded counselling must pay. Thus, my positive theory pre-
dicts that the Court would sustain the condition challenged in Rust, as it in
fact did.63
Richard Epstein, in contrast, contends that Rust was wrongly decided, and
he would strike down "either a prohibition or a requirement on [abortion]
counseling." Although he begins by asserting that the answer to the "key
question" of "whether there is any reason to be concerned with a uniform state
position on the subject [of abortion counselling], either way" depends on an
assessment of "the relative strength of the bargaining and takings risks" in this
context, his subsequent inquiry occupies only six sentences."
In appraising the "bargaining risks" posed by the Title X scheme, Epstein
inquires whether "the state wield[s] monopoly power in this area-in which
case both uniform rules, you can't speak or you must speak, should be struck
down." Although he contends that "there are no obvious barriers to entry
that impede setting up rival programs to pick up the slack or to counteract the
impression of the desirable options that government creates," he also specu-
lates that "the menu of alternatives to government programs may be far greater
in New York or San Francisco than it is in Amarillo or Fargo."67 And, appar-
ently considering further investigation (or elaboration) unnecessary, Epstein
concludes that the bargaining risks are unacceptably large in this context.
6
8
Epstein's consideration of the "takings risks" presented by the Title X
scheme is more cursory still. He simply asserts that "the takings risk here is
aggravated if the state takes either extreme position [on abortion counselling]
61. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality decision); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTmONAL LAW § 12-2 to -4, § 15-6 to -7, at 1320-26 (2d
ed. 1988).
62. Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. The Rust majority acknowledged that "lilt would undoubtedly be
easier for a woman seeking an abortion if she could receive information about abortion from a
Title X project, but the Constitution does not require that the Government distort the scope of its
mandated program in order to provide that information." Id.
63. Id.
64. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 300.
65. Id. at 299-300.
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because some citizens will necessarily be forced to fund programs with which
they are in strong philosophical or intellectual disagreement."'69
It is informative to compare Epstein's discussion of Rust with his analysis
of Harris v. McRae, ° a related, earlier case whose "irreducible tension" he
believes "carries over to [Rust]."'" At issue in Harris was the Hyde Amend-
ment to the Medicaid Act, which prohibits the use of any federal funds to
reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except under cer-
tain narrowly specified circumstances, although federal Medicaid funds may be
used to provide other medical services, including those incident to pregnancy
and childbirth.72 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the Hyde Amend-
ment under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the religion claus-
es of the First Amendment.73
The Medicaid Act after the Hyde Amendment can be construed as offer-
ing each otherwise eligible pregnant woman free pregnancy-related medical
care on the condition that she not have an abortion and instead carry the preg-
nancy to term. Under the test suggested by my positive theory, we must first
inquire whether this condition impinges on a constitutionally protected activity.
And it clearly does: under Roe v. Wade, the government cannot constitutional-
ly prohibit a woman from terminating her pregnancy during the first trimes-
ter.74
Under the second prong of the test, we must now ask whether the effect
of the challenged condition is to require women unable to earn a subsistence
income and otherwise eligible for Medicaid benefits to pay a higher price to
exercise their constitutional right to an abortion than similarly situated women
whose source of a subsistence income is employment.75 And it seems clear
that the condition does not have this effect. The Hyde Amendment did not, as
it might have, require that all Medicaid, food stamps, or other public assis-
tance be withheld from otherwise eligible women who choose to exercise their
constitutional right to an abortion.76 It simply declined to subsidize the exer-
69. Id. Epstein's preferred solution is not that the condition challenged in Rust be invalidat-
ed, but that the government "[g]et out of the counseling and referral business, save by charitable
deduction." Id. at 302. For Epstein, "the combined bargaining and takings risks doom any [gov-
ernment-funded] program that seeks to provide [reproductive] counseling and referral, at least so
long as Roe is on the books." Id. at 301.
70. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
71. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 300.
72. Harris, 448 U.S. at 301-03.
73. Id. at 301.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163, 164 (1973). The Roe majority held that prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester... the attending physician, in consultation
with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the
judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
Id. at 163. The majority also held, however, that "[flor the stage subsequent to approximately the
end of the first trimester [but prior to "viability"], the State, in promoting its interest in the health
of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably
related to maternal health." Id. at 164.
75. Whether the women, their spouses, or both are employed is irrelevant to this analysis.
76. Under this hypothetical law, the cost of an abortion to a claimant is the market price for
that service plus the loss of a statutory benefit (e.g., other medical care or food stamps) for which
she would have been eligible had she not exercised the pertinent constitutional right. Thus, the
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cise of that right, leaving Medicaid-eligible women to pay the same market
price that other women must pay if they choose to obtain an abortion. Thus,
my positive theory predicts that the Court would sustain the condition chal-
lenged in Harris, as it in fact did."
Epstein, too, would find the Hyde Amendment constitutional, 7  but his
view that Harris was correctly decided is difficult to reconcile with his con-
clusion that Rust was not.79 At the center of his analysis in both cases ap-
pears to be a reading of Roe to require some sort of "government neutrality"
on issues of reproductive choice. 0 Epstein is correct that "Roe works a dou-
ble transformation at a single leap: abortions move from the status of criminal
acts into 'fundamental rights."'' And in subsequent cases the Court has in
fact invalidated a variety of non-wealth-dependent restrictions on abortion,
other than criminalization, which it found to "unduly burden" that right.82 But
neither in Roe nor in any subsequent case did the Court mandate the sort of
government neutrality on reproductive choice that Epstein seems to envision.
Indeed, the Court in Roe explicitly held that its "decision leaves the State free
to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy length-
ens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state inter-
ests." 3 Even during the first trimester, when the State's constitutional author-
ity to regulate abortions is at its nadir, Roe mandates only that "the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the preg-
nant woman's attending physician."84
That a constitutional right is declared "fundamental" has never meant that
the government must subsidize the exercise of that right either in every in-
stance or whenever it chooses to subsidize the exercise of legitimate alterna-
tive activities. The fundamental right of parents to send their children to pri-
vate schools, recognized in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 has never been in-
terpreted to mean that the government must fund those schools if it chooses to
claimant, an individual unable to earn a subsistence income, would be required to pay a higher
price than a similarly situated person earning a subsistence income in order to exercise her con-
stitutional right to an abortion.
In both Harris and Maher, the Court explicitly discussed this hypothetical:
A substantial constitutional question would arise if Congress had attempted to withhold
all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate
had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by
abortion.... But the Hyde Amendment, unlike the statute at issue in Sherbert, does not
provide for such a broad disqualification from the receipt of public benefits. Rather, the
Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare provision at issue in Maher, represents
simply a refusal to subsidize certain protected conduct. A refusal to fund protected activ-
ity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a "penalty" on that activity.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 n.8 (1977).
77. Harris, 448 U.S. at 326-27.
78. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 285-94.
79. Compare id. at 285-94 with id. at 297-302.
80. See id. at 286-90, 299-302.
81. Id. at 289; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56.
82. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 1231 n.170; see also TRIBE, supra note 61, § 15-10, at
1341-45 and cases cited therein.
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
84. Id. at 164.
85. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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provide public schools. Nor has the fundamental right to reproduce, first rec-
ognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma,86 ever been construed to require that the
government hand out a voucher good for "one free childbirth" with each free
condom it chooses to distribute.
But Epstein's concern in both Harris and Rust with Roe and the nature of
the abortion right is something of a red herring in any case. For even though
he asserts that Roe requires a type of government neutrality on issues of repro-
ductive choice, which is not present in Harris or Rust,87 he nonetheless finds
Harris (but, intriguingly, not Rust) to have been correctly decided because of
the "takings risks" presented by the challenged condition.8 Observing that
"[tihe free exercise of religion, like the free exercise of speech, can be limited
as much by direct taxation as it can by prohibitions," 9 Epstein contends that
a persuasive free exercise argument in favor of the Hyde Amendment can be
made by those who oppose abortion for religious reasons but who, nonethe-
less, could be forced in the absence of the Amendment to pay, through their
taxes, for what they consider to be the murder of Medicaid recipients' unborn
children." And this argument suggests to Epstein that the Hyde Amendment
is not only constitutional but "constitutionally mandated."'
Epstein is quick to acknowledge, however, that "there are also establish-
ment clause arguments that can be brought against the Hyde Amendment."
Since "[m]any of those who oppose the funding of abortions do so on reli-
gious grounds," taxpayers who support government funding of abortions for
indigent women might argue that when their opponents "turn their preferences
into law, they have [unconstitutionally] established, at least in part, their reli-
gious beliefs under the Medicaid statutes."'93
One might now expect Epstein to tote up the number of likely claimants
under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses-much as the politi-
cal process arguably does in the course of enacting legislation such as the
Hyde Amendment-in order to reach the result that yields the greatest aggre-
gate social welfare. Instead, however, Epstein simply states that he finds the
Establishment Clause argument "more strained in this context than ... its free
exercise alternative,'94 and concludes that, although "a very hard call," the
Hyde Amendment should be sustained "but perhaps only by a bare 5 to 4
Vote.9
5
Unfortunately, Epstein's analysis of Harris rests on a reading of the reli-
gion clauses to which the Court has never subscribed. Epstein is correct only
in his (implicit) view that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses both
86. 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); TRIBE, supra
note 61, § 15-10.
87. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 286-90, 299-302.
88. Id. at 289-91. Compare id. at 297-302.




93. Id. at 290-91.
94. Id. at 291.
95. Id. at 294.
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create exceptions to the usual rule against taxpayer standing.96 The Establish-
ment Clause simply grants all taxpayers the right not to subsidize religion; it
affords no taxpayer the right not to subsidize abortion.97 Thus, although the
restrictions on abortion funding at issue in Harris may coincide with the tenets
of the Roman Catholic faith,98 for example, the Court has never held that a
statute violates the Establishment Clause just because it "happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." If an enactment "has
a secular legislative purpose, if its principal or primary effect neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and if it does not foster an excessive governmental entan-
glement with religion," it does not contravene the Establishment Clause.t"
And, as the majority observed in Harris, the Hyde Amendment "is as much a
reflection of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of
the views of any particular religion."' '
Nor has the Court been sympathetic to individual taxpayers' free exercise
claims for exemptions from generally applicable taxes. Given the federal
government's great interest in both the maintenance of, and uniform participa-
tion in, the tax system, the Court has held that the government must accom-
modate claims for exemptions only if doing so will not "unduly interfere with
fulfillment of the governmental interest."' And fearing that a slippery slope
would result, the Court has been reluctant to require such exemptions:
If, for example, a religious adherent believes war [or abortion] is a
sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified
as devoted to war- [or abortion-] related activities, such individuals
would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that
percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not function.' °3
It is not a coincidence that Epstein finds so much of basic religion clause
doctrine wrongheaded, nor that the unconstitutional conditions cases involving
public assistance benefits that he chooses to discuss are, to a highly dispro-
portionate extent, ones in which he contends the religion clauses are implicat-
ed."° In our post-New Deal world, the religion clauses constitute the stron-
96. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (Establishment Clause); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Free Exercise Clause); see also TRIBE, supra note 61, § 3-16, at 118-
19, § 14-13, at 1260-62.
97. On this point, compare Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
CHm. L. REv. 195, 210-11 (1992), with Michael M. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Cross-
roads, 59 U. Cam. L. REV. 115, 164, 168-69 (1992), and with Michael M. McConnell, The Selec-
tive Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REV. 989, 1006-14 (1991).
98. This was in fact a claim raised by the appellees in Harris, and acknowledged by the
Court to be a plausible view of the challenged funding restriction. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 319-20.
99. Id. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
100. Id. (quoting Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980)).
101. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 138-41.
102. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982); see also TRIBE, supra note 61, § 14-13,
at 1260-63.
103. Lee, 445 U.S. at 260. Epstein, not surprisingly, considers the Court's analysis in Lee to
be "seriously defective," not least because "the Court is surely wrong when it writes as though
there were a slippery slope problem." EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 268, 269-70. Thus, Epstein per-
sists in advocating that the government create separate "risk pools" in various contexts, notwith-
standing his awareness that the Court implicitly, but no less clearly, rejected this solution in Lee.
Id. at 262 n.28.
104. Of the 25 unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance benefits which the
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gest-perhaps the only-constitutional barrier to income redistribution that re-
mains. 5 Because Epstein precommitted not to devote Bargaining with the
State to declaring the New Deal unconstitutional," 6 but nonetheless believes
that "a constitutional order that imposed restrictions upon redistribution
through taxation and state welfare benefits" has much to recommend it,"1
7
the religion clauses are his last, best hope. It is therefore not surprising that he
systematically (mis)reads those clauses with an eye toward maximizing their
coverage, or that he is most eager to discuss cases in which his expansive
reading of these clauses could be deployed to curtail redistribution and there-
by, he believes, increase aggregate social welfare. Indeed, Epstein himself ob-
serves that "[o]nce general takings and public trust arguments are no longer
sufficient to forestall all forms of redistribution, whether covert or overt, be-
tween A and B, then additional pressure is placed upon the religion clauses to
forbid redistribution both from or to any religious group.""'5 He might have
added that he, at least, would also comfortably place additional pressure on the
notion of a "religious group."
In the end, Epstein's discussions of Rust and Harris are likely to leave the
reader unsatisfied for at least two reasons. First, he never explains why his
analysis of the takings risks at issue in Rust does not track his decisive analy-
sis of those risks in Harris. Why doesn't Rust, too, come down to the oppos-
ing free exercise and establishment claims of taxpayers which so trouble Ep-
stein in Harris? As in Harris, the free exercise argument in Rust would be
made by those who oppose abortion for religious reasons, but who nonetheless
could be forced, in the absence of the challenged Title X regulations, to pay
through their taxes for speech promoting what they consider to be the murder
of unborn children." And taxpayers opposed to the Title X regulations
would, as in Harris, argue that since many who favor the "gag order" imposed
by the regulations do so on religious grounds, when they "turn their prefer-
ences into law, they have [unconstitutionally] established, at least in part, their
religious beliefs under [federal law].""' Thus, one would expect Epstein to
sustain the Title X regulations at issue in Rust if, as in Harris, he finds the
Establishment Clause argument in this context "more strained" than its free
exercise alternative.'
Court has heard since 1963, only 11 (44%) implicate the religion clauses, even under Epstein's
expansive reading of those clauses. In Bargaining with the State, Epstein discusses 9 of these 25
cases, 7 (78%) of which he contends implicate the religion clauses.
105. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, nearly all state constitutions include explicit restrictions on
"special legislation," which may preclude some forms of forced redistribution. See Clayton P.
Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L.
REv. 625, 642-57 (1994); see also Lyman H. Cloe & Sumner Marcus, Special and Local Legisla-
tion, 24 KY. L.J. 351 (1936).
106. See supra note 51.
107. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 294; see also id. at 300-02.
108. Id. at 260-61. Although Epstein would clearly favor this additional pressure on the reli-
gion clauses, he does not demonstrate that the post-New Deal Court shares his preference.
109. Id. at 290.
110. Id.at290-91.
111. Id. at 291.
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Perhaps Epstein does not find the Establishment Clause argument more
strained than its free exercise alternative in the context of Rust. Perhaps, for
purposes of his "takings" analysis under the religion clauses, he considers
government funding of speech promoting abortion (Rust) to be importantly
different from government funding of actual abortions (Harris). Or perhaps he
believes government funding of medical expenses related to childbirth, but not
those related to abortion, to constitute the desired government neutrality on
issues of reproduction in a way that the government funding of pro-life, but
not pro-choice, reproductive counselling conceivably does not. Unfortunately,
Epstein does not say.
Second, in applying his normative theory to Harris and Rust, Epstein
never answers the question of whether the Court, given its existing understand-
ing of the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the constitu-
tional right to an abortion, should have sustained the benefit condition at issue
in either case. By basing his discussion of both cases on revisionist readings of
the relevant constitutional guarantees, Epstein, as in his discussion of Smith,
substantially undercuts the usefulness and persuasiveness of that analysis, and
ultimately of his proposed normative theory, for those (surely including the
Court) who do not subscribe to his readings.
IV. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V. MORENO AND
DANDRIDGE V. WILLIAMS
Given his penchant for both constitutional revisionism and unconstitution-
al conditions cases that lend themselves to analysis under the religion clauses,
Epstein's discussion of cases such as Smith, Rust, and Harris sheds little light
on the many unconstitutional conditions cases involving public assistance
benefits that he does not discuss. Thus, before passing final judgment on
Epstein's theory, it might be informative to attempt to apply it to cases such as
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno"' and Dandridge v.
Williams,"3 which he does not discuss and which do not involve the religion
clauses, even under Epstein's expansive reading of them.
At issue in Moreno was a federal statutory provision that disqualified for
food stamps any otherwise eligible persons who lived in a household contain-
ing any unrelated individuals." 4 This statute arguably required some persons
otherwise eligible for food stamps to choose between receiving that public
assistance or exercising their First Amendment freedom of association."5
112. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
113. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
114. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
115. Although the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridg-
ing ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble," this freedom of association has never been
understood to include an absolute right to live with an unrelated person under any and all circum-
stances. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding village ordi-
nance restricting land use to one-family dwellings and defining "family" as not more than two
unrelated persons). Beginning with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
reasonable zoning laws bearing a substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general wel-
fare have been held to be valid exercises of the states' police power. See also TRIBE, supra note
61, § 15-17.
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If I read Epstein correctly, he would have us inquire whether this combi-
nation of government largesse plus condition maximizes social welfare relative
to other possibilities, including making the benefit available without the chal-
lenged condition."6 To begin, it is not clear that anyone gains from this par-
ticular condition on the receipt of food stamps. Some persons eligible for food
stamps will likely forego living in households containing any unrelated indi-
viduals in order to receive this needed benefit. In doing so, however, they may
give up not only the exercise of their First Amendment freedom of associa-
tion, but also important economies of scale in their necessary living expenses.
Nor would this condition appear to make the taxpayers who fund the food
stamp program-or anyone else-better off. A small number of otherwise
eligible persons may choose to forego food stamps and live in a household
with unrelated individuals. But the ultimate savings, if any, to taxpayers from
this tiny decrease in the total dollar amount of food stamps distributed will
surely be outweighed many times over by the increased administrative and
monitoring costs that will attend the imposition of this condition." 7
Thus, the condition on food stamp benefits at issue in Moreno appears to
be one of Epstein's "perverse conditions" with no allocative gains."' And I
expect that Epstein applauds the Court's inability to find any rational basis for
this challenged condition under modem equal protection law," 9 at least as
much as he likely marvels at the ability of interest group politics to generate
in the challenged legislation a set 6f outcomes from which no one apparently
benefits. 2 °
An analysis of Moreno under the test suggested by my positive theory
reaches Epstein's result, but by a different route. The challenged condition
clearly involves a constitutionally protected activity insofar as it impinges on
food stamp claimants' First Amendment right to live with persons of their own
choosing.' 2' Thus, we proceed under the second prong to ask whether the
effect of this challenged condition is to require persons unable to earn a sub-
sistence income, and otherwise eligible for food stamps, to pay a higher price
to exercise their First Amendment freedom of association than similarly situ-
ated persons earning a subsistence income.
Anyone choosing to live in a household containing unrelated individuals
might expect to incur certain costs from this choice of living situation and
companions, such as diminished privacy or other inconveniences. The person
whose source of a subsistence income is employment, however, does not typ-
ically in addition suffer the loss of that income should he exercise his consti-
tutional freedom of association in this way. Thus, the condition challenged in
Moreno clearly imposes a surcharge on the price individuals eligible for food
116. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 98-103.
117. In addition to the increased administrative and monitoring costs, taxpayers may ultimate-
ly bear an increase in the cost of providing health care for those whose nutrition suffers as a result
of their decision to forego food stamps.
118. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 99, 101.
119. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
120. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 101.
121. See supra note 115.
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stamps must pay to exercise their First Amendment rights. And my theory
therefore predicts that the Court would invalidate the condition, as it in fact
did.
22
At least in the Moreno context, the analytical path prescribed by Epstein's
theory is not obviously more speculative, less determinate, or more convoluted
than the path prescribed by the test suggested by my positive theory or, there-
fore, the path implicitly taken by the Court. And, as we have just seen, the
destination reached is the same.
Consider one final case. Dandridge v. Williams concerned a challenge on
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds to a Maryland "maximum
grant regulation" that provided AFDC benefits to most eligible families in full
accord with the state-computed "standard of need," but imposed a ceiling on
the monthly amount of money any one family could receive.' 2' Thus, under
the Maryland regulation, a family of nine with a state-computed need of nearly
$300 per month, and a family of six with a computed need of $250 per month
would each receive the same $250 per month maximum grant.'24 This regu-
lation arguably burdened the claimant parent's'" constitutional right to pro-
create insofar as it provided the parent a financial incentive to limit the family
to six or fewer persons, the size at which the offered benefits were sufficient
to cover the family's state-computed need.'26
As before, Epstein likely would have us ask whether this combination of
government largesse plus condition will maximize social welfare relative to
other possibilities, including making the benefit available without the chal-
lenged condition.' If we assume, consistent with the Court's finding, that
the state of Maryland was willing to devote only a determinate amount of its
total revenue to AFDC benefits, and that this amount was insufficient to meet
the state-computed need of all recipient households, 2 ' the issue becomes one
solely of the optimal allocation of benefits among AFDC-recipient households.
Should all eligible families, regardless of size, receive, say, 95% of their state-
122. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
123. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473-75 (1970).
124. Id. at 490-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. The pertinent federal statutory provisions do not restrict AFDC benefits to single-parent
families. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)-(c) (1988). The vast majority of claimants, however, have histor-
ically been female-headed, single-parent households. See SAR A. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF
THE POOR 30-39 (3d ed. 1976).
126. The fundamental constitutional fight to procreate can be traced to Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The regulation at issue in Dandridge also arguably burdened the claimant parent's freedom
of association insofar as it provided a financial incentive to limit the resident family to six or
fewer persons. But no more than in the case of the fight to procreate does the challenged condi-
tion require those unable to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for AFDC benefits,
to pay a higher price to exercise that constitutional fight than similarly situated persons whose
source of a subsistence income is employment- If a family of seven, for example, has one child
live elsewhere in order to reduce the size of its AFDC claimant unit to six, the family does not
thereby increase its total monthly amount of benefits. The family's per capita income may now be
greater than if all seven family members were living at home, but only if the family is not provid-
ing the nonresident child financial support. This state of affairs is the same for a family whose
source of a subsistence income is employment rather than AFDC benefits.
127. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 98-103.
128. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473-75.
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computed need? Or should eligible families of six or fewer persons receive
100% of their computed need, while families with seven or more persons
receive only 80% or less of theirs (the exact percentage decreasing as family
size increases)?
Whether, under the latter scheme, the aggregate benefits to the smaller
families exceed the aggregate costs to the larger families will depend on facts
such as the effect of the scheme on both larger and smaller families' incidence
of malnutrition, illness, homelessness, illiteracy, and death, and therefore poses
a seemingly intractable measurement problem. But if I understand Epstein's
general theory correctly, he would find this Maryland scheme unacceptable
even if it were (somehow) determined to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because it
fails his pro rata test.'29 That is, the social gains induced by the Maryland
scheme relative to a scheme that would give all eligible families 95% of their
state-computed need are gains that accrue solely to families of six or fewer
members. Thus, I expect Epstein would conclude that the Burger Court erred
when it upheld the Maryland scheme. 3
My positive theory, in contrast, suggests that the Court's decision in
Dandridge was consistent with its decisions in other unconstitutional condi-
tions cases involving public assistance benefits and, as in those other cases,
therefore reflects the normative underpinnings of that theory. 3' Under the
Maryland scheme, an eligible parent with a family of six will not receive any
increase in total AFDC benefits if he or she has another child.'32 This means
that the per capita income of the family will be reduced since seven people
will be supported on the same amount of money as six were previously. This
reduction in per capita income, however, does not require AFDC-eligible
parents to pay a higher price to exercise their constitutional right to procreate
than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income: an analogous
reduction in per capita income upon the birth of a child is typically realized by
those whose source of a subsistence income is employment. 3 3 That is, the
price of exercising one's right to procreate typically includes a reduction in
per capita income, whatever its source, assuming one's total monthly income
is held constant.'34 Because the Maryland scheme simply leaves AFDC-eligi-
ble parents to pay the same price to exercise their right to procreate that other,
129. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 96-103.
130. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87.
131. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
132. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473-75.
133. The underlying assumption, consistent with current and past law, is that parents are
responsible for the financial support of their minor children in AFDC-recipient families as well as
in families whose sole source of income is the parent(s)'s employment. For discussion of parents'
legal duty to provide support for the maintenance of their children, see, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN
& D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW 177-228 (2d ed. 1989).
134. This is a reasonable assumption since the total dollar amount of one's monthly earnings
through employment is, in any case, not usually related to family size. That is, a private employer
is not typically expected to provide an employee a pay increase upon the birth of a child in order
to ensure that the per capita income of the employee's family remains constant.
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non-indigent parents pay, my theory predicts that the Dandridge Court would
sustain the challenged "maximum grant regulation," as it in fact did.'35
Under my positive theory, the Maryland scheme is critically different
from a hypothetical regulation under which the total monthly amount of
AFDC benefits provided an eligible family of seven is less than, rather than
the same as, that for an eligible family of six. This hypothetical scheme would
require AFDC-eligible parents with families of six to pay a higher price to
exercise their right to procreate than other, non-indigent parents pay. For in
addition to the reduction in the family's per capita income that typically at-
tends the birth of another child, these AFDC-eligible parents would also expe-
rience a reduction in their family's total AFDC income. Thus, my positive
theory predicts that the Court, in contrast to its holding in Dandridge, would
find this hypothetical scheme unconstitutional.
I expect that Epstein, in contrast, would find this hypothetical scheme
neither better nor worse than the actual Maryland scheme at issue in
Dandridge. For this hypothetical scheme, too, fails Epstein's pro rata test:" 36
the social gains induced by the hypothetical scheme relative to a scheme that
would give all AFDC-eligible families 95% of their state-computed need are
gains that accrue solely to eligible families of six or fewer members.
In the Dandridge context, Epstein's requirement that the Court assess
whether the combination of government largesse plus challenged condition will
maximize social welfare relative to other possibilities seems at first to pose an
intractable measurement problem. It is not that courts are obviously less com-
petent than the state legislature to assess the effect of the Maryland scheme on
both larger and smaller families' incidence of malnutrition, illness,
homelessness, illiteracy, and death. Rather, we doubt that any institution could
accomplish the task.'37 But this potentially fatal weakness in Epstein's pro-
posed standard of judicial review appears largely obviated by its "pro rata"
component. At least in the Dandridge context, it seems remarkably easy to
identify any deviation from formal equality in the allocation of the social gains
that the challenged benefit scheme generates.
Nonetheless, Epstein's pro rata test is problematic here because it yields a
result that some, perhaps even Epstein, will find perverse. By precluding
"maximum grant" limitations such as the challenged Maryland regulation, the
test ensures those eligible for public assistance a different, more robust right to
procreate than the Constitution currently affords those whose source of a sub-
sistence income is employment. At present, neither public nor private employ-
ers are required by the Constitution to provide-and typically do not pro-
vide-employees a pay increase upon the birth of a child in order to ensure
that the per capita income of the employee's family is not diminished by the
employee's exercise of the constitutional right to procreate. Thus, by implicitly
requiring a proportional increase in the family's total AFDC benefits whenever
a recipient parent gives birth to another child, Epstein's pro rata test perversely
135. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87.
136. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 96-103.
137. I also query how and whether we could assess the accuracy of any proffered results.
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elevates procreation by these indigent parents from the constitutional right that
all others have to a kind of constitutional entitlement.
38
V. CONCLUSION
Would social welfare be increased if in unconstitutional conditions cases
involving public assistance benefits the Court employed Epstein's proposed
test rather than the test my positive theory suggests the Court sub silentio has
applied in these cases since 1963? It is hard to know. To compare the tests is
to compare apples and airplanes. The test suggested by my positive theory
holds constant the existing law in all areas other than unconstitutional condi-
tions cases involving public assistance benefits. In contrast, under Epstein's
test, at least as he has applied it, the only constant is the goal of maximizing
overall social welfare. Thus, as his discussions of Smith, Rust, and Harris
reveal, Epstein's analysis of unconstitutional conditions cases involving public
assistance benefits frequently rests on revisionist readings of the relevant con-
stitutional provisions and precedent, readings that were themselves presumably
mandated by his larger goal of maximizing aggregate social welfare.
Moreover, as Epstein himself has observed in another context, "it is one
thing to identify past errors" (as his normative theory does with great fecundi-
ty), "and quite another to remedy them, even if we could summon the will to
do so.""' Just because a different standard of judicial review might in prin-
ciple be preferable to an existing one of long standing does not mean that a
wholesale shift to that new standard today would be equally preferable. The
dislocation wrought by such a change might be prohibitively costly, even
evil."4 Nonetheless, according to Epstein, "[a] correct theory at the very
least can lead to incremental changes in the proper direction, even though it
cannot transform the world," particularly given "the present structure of consti-
tutional law [which] does admit a high degree of play at the joints.
4
1
But is Epstein's theory "correct"? This, too, is hard to know. Although
not uncontroversial, his goal of maximizing overall social welfare is surely
attractive to many (including the author of this Essay) and, in any case, not
obviously evil. 42 Moreover, when the task of determining whether a chal-
138. The resulting entitlement is not a pure one, however, since it exists only so long as the
state chooses to provide AFDC at all, and the state has no constitutional obligation to offer this
benefit. For a discussion of the distinction between constitutional rights and entitlements, see
Baker, supra note 3, at 1218-20.
139. TAKINGS, supra note 50, at 306.
140. Epstein observed in Takings for example, that to abolish welfare while keeping the mini-
mum wage in place "should not be done" because it would "deprive individuals of welfare pay-
ments at the same time they are blocked from gainful employment." Id. at 326. Epstein continued:
Similarly, many persons have made substantial forced contributions to Social Security
that have already been spent on transfer payments to others. To abolish Social Security
in medias res is worse than foolish; it is evil.... Too many individuals have foregone
the opportunity to accumulate private savings in reliance upon the programs that are
now in place.
Id.
141. Id. at 329.
142. At least one reviewer has expressed frustration, however, that "the reader never learns
why an indeterminate social improvement standard is better, for example, than an indeterminate
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lenged condition on a government benefit advances overall social welfare
relative to other possibilities takes the form of applying Epstein's "pro rata"
test, it does not seem obviously more onerous or beyond the competence of
the courts than established judicial tasks such as ascertaining the "best inter-
ests of the child" in custody disputes'43 or deciding when police activity con-
stitutes an "unreasonable search."'" Indeed my attempts above to apply
Epstein's test to Moreno and Dandridge are evidence that the task is often
quite readily performed.'45 Nonetheless, as that analysis of Dandridge also
reveals, his test yields results in some cases which appear perverse, at least
within our current constitutional culture. More study is necessary to determine
whether such results are the product of some larger deficiency in the substance
of Epstein's theory, or merely of easily avoidable errors in its application.
By seeking to apply Epstein's central theory to cases that he has not di-
rectly addressed, I hope to have demonstrated my conviction that his approach
to the paradox of unconstitutional conditions at a minimum forces us to con-
sider these cases in a new and interesting way. That reasonable people might
nonetheless disagree with Epstein's selection of baselines,"4 or dispute
whether a unitary standard can or should govern judicial review of cases rais-
ing unconstitutional conditions questions," should suggest the difficulty of
the unconstitutional conditions paradox, not the inadequacy of Epstein's ambi-
tious and thoughtful contribution.
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